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This paper has two purposes.Firstitdevelops a simple analticaIlv
tractable model of inflation for an ccononlv characterized h two output
(flexprice and lixprice) markets and one input (labor) market. The model
incorporates most of the major elements of' short run inflationtheory and
demonstrates, at least in a stylized way. how inflation can hetransmitted
and sustained. Second, the study imposes a set of temporary wageand
price controls on the model. The impact of these controls is examined to
identify the circumstances under which controls might. and also might
not, be appropriate, and also to suggest how controlsmight be designed to
satisfy certain allocation, equity. and termination criteria.
2. Tit E INn.1vr10N MOl)F i.
Price and wage behavior is examined in a simple economychar-
acterized by two output markets and a single labor (input) market.Prices
in one output sector are determined primarily in auction-typemarkets.
while prices in the other sector are largely administered. The first market-
type is representative of agricultural and commoditymarkets in which
prices are determined largely by excess demand considerations.The sec-
ond market-type is typical of many manufacturing industries inwhich
prices are largely determined by some mark up strategy.Gordon [3).
Hicks [51 and Moroshinia [6] refer to the former as the /k'.vpricemarket
and the latter as the /ixprice market. Okun [7] prefers tocall them the
auction market and the customer market,respectively.
tthe authors are particularly graietui to the referees of this journal tartheir t houghi-
ful and very helpful conlnients. fhev would also like to acknocs edgelinaiicial support or
this siudprovided by the Graduate School (An/aria State University) andInsesiors in
Business Education (University of liii iois).I
In this simple CCOAOO1Y the labormarket isspecilied bya wagefor- mation equation in whichwage increases arcassumed torespond to
Urice increase expectatioflS and toexcess demandconsiderationsin thatmar. ket. Price increase expectatiOnsare assumed to heforriedtdtptiI are related to past price increasesin bothoutput markets
both output prices and wagesinfluence costs, thepostulatedmark up
strategy of the tIxprice sectorraises prices in thatsector, and these
increases intur feedback into increasedwage demands.Furthermore,theresulting changes in relative prices ofthe two sectorsimply a shiftin thecorn. position of demand(even if oneassumes that nominal
aggregatedemand is held constantor is determined
cxogenouslv). andthis toofeeds the inflation process. In thisstudy aggregatedemand andsupplyconsidera. tions are, in fact, assumedto he determined
exogenously.However,the model can be readilyadapted to allowbr theimpact oftIscaland/or monetary policies.
A. The Flexprice(A uction) Market
In this market itis assumed thatthe dominantdeterminant ofprice movements arcoutput excess demandconsiderations.Prices areassumed to be essentiallyunrelated toshort-run changesin costs;possibly be. cause in many ofthese commodityor auction markets,labor costsare relativelyunimportant.





wheree = income elasticityof demand
price elasticityof demand
= cross price elasticityof demand
The quantitysupplied isassumed to begiven exogenousl)and is con- trolled by thevagaries of theweather andby the OPECministers and/or other domesticand internationalcartelmanagers. Consequently, thesup- ply function isof the form
I-Is ,--IS VA? =
Finally it isassumed thatprices respondto excess demandas given by (3>
=
where k= elasticity ofprice adjustment,and = P.0(l± p= the trendflexprice whichinsures some long run price parityfor thefiexprice sector. Combining(I), (2),and (3)yields
(2)
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Equation (4) can easily he rewritten as
(5) PA , =kyp-t- k/p1 ±e
Y where
n
ct= kiv, -kq+ p
andP4(:+I,is the percentage change in
>,v,isthe percentage
change in Y,, etc.
It should be clear from (5) that inflation can he initiated either bya
contraction in the quantity supplied in the flexprice market or by an
increase in demand resulting from an increase in national income Y,.
B.The Fixprice (Customer) Market
The dominant market clearing mechanism in this sector is a quantity
adjustment process. Accordingly, prices are essentially independent of
short runexcess demand considerations and are instead largely cost de-
termined as firms employ a mark up strategy. The three inputs employed
are customer goods, auction goods and labor. The mark up relationship
can be written in lagged form as
(6)
+ I) =ij[(OPc + + + (I -)(Opc.r 1 -+ I
+ (I -i)2(Op.,2 + 1//P4(g_2 +1t_2) 4-
where i', is the percentage change in unit labor costs, defined as theper-
centage change in nominal wages, w,, minus the percentage change in
long-run productivity, p',.
After a Koyck transformation this yields
(7) Pc(t+I=(I -+ i9)p, + 1?1'p, +11t
In this equationrepresents the response coefficient, with a larger iim-
plying a more rapid pass through of costs. The coefficients 0,', andsum
to one and represent the relative intensity of use of customer goods, auc-
tion goods and labor in the production process. It should be evident from
(7) that price increases in the fixprice market are notdirect/vapected by
changes in short run aggregate demand. However these prices are indi-
rectly influenced by aggregate demand through the corresponding tight
labor market.
C.TheLahor Market
The labor market is assumed to be characterized by a combination
of 'administered' pricing and excess (input) demand considerations. In
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particular it is assumed that employees liv 10 obtain a 'lair' moneywa
increasehich covers both mv productivity increase and anCpCcte(l
price increac. The actual increase is also intluenced hexcess deniatiti
in the labor market This relitiionsh ip ;s tti yen by
ii',i - P':.= P/I!: Ii+i(L, --1 7).
wherepr1 = the percentage change in labor p10(1 uctivily
= the unemployment rate.
L'7the natural unemplovnicnt rate, and
= the expected percentage change in overall prices.
The actual percentage change in overall prices isaveighted sum of the
percentage change in customer and auction prices. That is,
p,, = VP.: f (I -
where p = the fraction of final output comprised ofauction goods.
In addition we assume that expectionsare formed adaptivelv so that
p>1+> = + (I--)p,+ (I 2> +''i.
Substituting (9) and (10) into (8) and usinga Kovck transformation yields
(II) =( I-,')p., +z'p,-i-(I- ;.-
where
(1=ô( L',L7 )- ô (1 )( L,-.(17
D. The ('omp/ete Model
The complete inflation model isthus specilied by equations(5), (7). and (II). To Illustrate the basicdynamics of the model, plausibleparam- eter values were appioxirnated fromestimates reported in otherrelated studies. These parameterestimates include: k=6, =I,= .7,'y = .55. and p= .01 for equation (5): z= .3, 0 .2.= .1. and 5 = .7 for equation (7) and.'= .1, .55 and= .3 for equation (II). As a check
the three reduced formequations, (5), (7) and (Ii)were also estimated
directly, and these estimatescorrespond surprisingly wellto the parameter values obtained fromother sources The directestimates include ky= .334 and k= .430 for equation (5): (I-+O) = .766, = .028, andØ = .205 for equation(7): and(1 - v)= .495.e.055 and (I-) = .450 for equation (II).
Four simulationresults for the inflationmodel are presented in
















1-II ISIARKIl P1(1(1 I( RI A(l11(AJIiIi)RiI ',INIII-l!\IIiiCi_II I\I'klii M091 I
AF,.!,i,hr,.On (hg' wth 0Or, Fl*.pr'-e Suppk Shri:('
1).3 with ,j= .3
Period P, P '4 P1 P ii Pi
1.500 3.000 I .650 1.650 .500 3.001) .650 1.650
2 1.572 .3(17 1.65)) 1.455 .572 2.60)) I .651) I .67-I
3 1.549 I .4)19 1537 1.543 .6)5 2.414 1.663 I .695
4 1.543 .973 1.540 I .46)1 .646 2.126 .6)11 t .695
5 1.524 1.193 1.510 1.491 .665 I57)1 I .6)15 I .656
C. 10, Flexprice Shortage. I).I0'I lexprice SuppI Shortage
I, ExceDemand. j = .3 with= .6
Period P Pa Pi P P Pi
I 1.500 3.00(3 1.65(1 1.650 1.500 3.000 I .651) 1.630
2 I .572 2.600 1.950 1.674 1.653 2.600 I .650 1.747
3 1.676 2.414 1.963 1.750 1,708 2.441 I .7(13 1.781
4 1.754 2.147 2.011 1793 173(1 2.1-IS 1.746 1.791)
5 1.816 1.905 2.056 1.823 1.772 1.904 1.770 1.785
6 1.865 1.647 2.094 1.843 )779 1.632 1.778 1.765
7 1.903 1.392 1.821 1.852 1.770 1.37(1 1.771 1.730
8 I .869 I. 132 1.838 1.796 1.746 I .098 I .748 1.681
9 1.840 1.233 1.815 1.779 1.708 1.21)7 1.712 1.638
10 1.815i.I:O .795 1.751 1.680 1.147 .682 1.626
II 1.794 1.194 1.771 1.731 1.649 1.163 1.651 1.60))
12 1.71)7 1.180 1.749 1.708 1.621 I .16(1 I .623 1.573
table I-All four simulations assume the same initial conditions, i.e., first
period quarterly inflation rates of 1.5",,, 3.0,, and 1.65°,, respectively in
the fixprice, flexprice, and labor sectors. In the first simulation, no addi-
tional excess demand considerations are introduced. Nevertheless after 12
periods a quarterly inflation rate of approximately 1.40,, persists. In the
second simulation reported the only inflationary stimulus is a 10",, short-
fall in supply in the flexprice (auction) sector. This shortfall is assumed to
persist for six quarters. A substantially higher rate of inflation obtains
both in the short run and at the end of the planning horizon. In the third
simulation in addition to the 10",, supply shortfall in the flexprice sector a
I"., increase in aggregate demand is introduced. The resulting inflationar\
trajectories are given in table IC. The fourth simulation reported uses
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6 1.50 .092 1.5(5) I .468 .674 I .608 I .687 1.667
7 1.494 1.130 I .482 I .458 .673 1.345 I .676 .650
8 1.479 1.150 1.469 1.442 .662 (.076 I .656 1.603
9 1.465 1.113 1.454 1.430 .642l.lss 1.627 1.596
10 1.451 1.106 1.441 1.416 .624 1.133 1.61)) 1.573
II 1.437 1.104 1.427 1.404 .605 1.151 1.59) .559
2 1.424 1.101 1.414 .391 .587 1.137 1.574 .542I
the same economic environmentas the second: however, the passthrougi) coefficient ;j has been doubledIrOn] .3 to The sensitivitof the mocj
to this particu!ar parameter has been exploredbecause thereappeato he
some evidence of a :/zre.v1w/1 e//t't! which dlaii,aticallvincreases thespeed with which cost increasesare recouped when the rate of inflationexceeds a certain level. One should not, however, inferfrom thissensitivity es- perirnent that the parameter valueseriiploved in this studyare ojjered as
anything other than plau.rib/e estimates.
3. Wx;i ANI) Pki(-j; CONTROLS
Income policies of any formare conlroversiil and directcontrols are particularly suspect. Twoquestions arise rather naturally inthis context Is it possible to identifyany circumstances under whichcontrols are ap- propriate? How should controls hedesigned to satisfy certainaIlocatiJ,I and equity properties? Theseare not really separate questionsbecause the economic arguments against controlsare typically couched interms of in- duced misallocation and ofinduced inequitablercdistrihutitsn of inconle
Proponents of controlsacknowledge these shortcomingsHowever they maintain that insome circumstances controlspermit the use of stimulative monetary and/orfiscal measures whosepositive ml pacts more than ofliset any negativeimpact of controls. Thisargument can not be fully tested in the model outlinedabove, because in itaggregate demand isas- sumed to be determinedexogenousfHowever, the modelcan he used to estimate the potentialfor induced misallocatiol]and income redistrihu tion. It can also be usedto derive control ruleswhich mmml i/c thesenega- tive features.
A. The CriterionFu,zc't ion










P1(J +ugh The first term of this function. u,n, - pt. is designed to insure
odtI that the percentage price increasep,, does not differ substantially from
he the targeted price increase pt which may be set equal to sonic historical
)eed norm.
'eds The second term of the welfare function,ii',- p ,is designed to
protect the purchasing power of the wage earner or salaried employee,
and iii us to guarantee that the burden of stopping the inflation is borne by
both wage earner and property owner. It is evident from this term thai
whenever the increase in money wages adjusted for productivity gains
fails to compensate for price changes, a penalty is incurred. Conversely,a
penalty is imposed whenever the relative share of property income
are deteriorates.
CXL.
The most severe critics of incomes policies typically focus on price
controls' potential for disrupting the allocative function of the market, It
Lion is obvious that imposed uniform price and wage increases eliminate this
he function completely. Therefore, it is important to design policymeasures
Iin- so as to preserve some relative price flexibility in response to market
le. pressures. The third, fourth and fifth terms of equation (12) are intended




ised where the price ratio p7,/'7 represents the relative price increase which
bu- would have prevailed in the absence of controls. Deviations from this
ga- ratio are penaliied because the controlled price relatives may transmit
ertoneous signals.
A final important characteristic of any temporary control is that the
termination of the control should be more or less automatic, and that this
1 suspension should not induce a wage-price explosion such as occurred in
197374. Wage controls, for example, can only be readily abandoned
whenever the restraining impact of the control is minimal, i.e., whenever
the control rule grants most of the free market wage demand. Further-
11




It is evident from the analysis in the previous section and, inpar-
icve ticular, from equation (8) that asPi( +approaches p7, adjusted wage
increases, induced by market forces will stabilize at p7. From(7)it
lollows that market induced price increasesp, will also stabilize at p7.
Consequently a major objective of any control strategy is to reduce the
price increase expectation PiT*ii to Pir+i,. The last term of the cri-
terion function. uP(T+ 1 - PT4 , Iisdesignedto accomplishthis
objective.
The first and fifth terms of (12) can be combined using the relation-/
shipu, = u + (I--
- Thisrelationshiptsderived from(10)
The critertonI ti[lctiOfl (12)an then he replacedhthe (BOretractable
quadrahc structureof (13)given below.2
13.i'/ze ('o,iirof ilteoreije io,-,nu/aiw,z of the I'roble,n
A formal statement of the wage-price control model iiopossible
The objectiveisto niinimite
(13) 13 = u(p,p*)2+ (u',p,)2+ u2(p7,/7
. )2
-f-I
+ u (p * -
2+ 4 n 7p
subject to either oneortwoofthefollowingprice andwageincrease equations
P4t +I) = '.'f(,/%/4 +t,
Is= (I - 7/ + iO)p5-1 + ?j/i, f-1)i3O,
= ç( I -, + + (I
-fl it-, + ,
% tb P, +(I i')ii/7= P7/W7m7= p,/t7aridn7= Itshouldbe clear from (5). (7) and(II)that any inflationinthis economy can be brought under control either byemployingaggregite de- mand policies includingnionetarv and fiscal measures 'hichalter c, and ci,.orbycontrolling either wageor price increases. If the policyoption selected is to override thewage formation equation (II),i.e., to impose threci wage contmtc,the price formationequations(5)and(7)govern the inflationary process, and thecontrol variable is;, of' equation (7). This
choice does not necessarilypreclude price controls hutPrices niust only be controlled ata level Consistent with thosegenerated by market k)rccS,
2An ahtcrn,Itiseiormalation of the criterionhjflct!ofl nould replace the';isthterni of (12) ssith p p rhis formulationappropriate Ii) s;ige controlshas the adsan- (age of iovusiiig directlon the basic ohjectie of thecontrols shich is to alignsi.ige in- creases adj usted for prod netI is gains with the forciedrate ol inflation-1 he trade oil he- tseen this termand the second terni of(!2). shicfi is designedto align adjusted uage in- creasesith the i'urrgizj rate ofinflation in order topreserve labor's share of nationalincome. Is Ifl]fliediatels apparent Theinclusion of the term also ohs sitesthe need for the twa! periodexpectation terni. because itforces and thereforepto approach p7 earls !i] the planning'non/onthis assures thatp r p -The dkadiantage of this forriiu(atioiiis that equaiiiigand is auI'I!ir'fr)e5/ji,(. ohpcct iSe (flu us-hlike a inonc\ uppk targetj, 'hichprosides no U/U,,Uj,i. utjljtsfor its attainment This .ilteri],itneformulation dues nutina(erjallalter the major lindine'ssit this studs toresaniple equations(16) and (t7( heloInipIs a control rulecliaracteni/ed hs a sari,ihle polics coefficient Thisfinding also obtains forthe aIter,i,itjveciiterion Function.\ sone- us hat more suhstantil
rnodfjc,ttofl i_s required forequation ttsulmichi must he ressrituen as i,i/2(p+f( -(n/2)AIi ihus implies amore vigoroth .umd sonueishau less euuitahle a age control role'ase
Oj. i.e., by equations (5)and (7),Alternatively, the price increase trajectories
ihle generated by these equations can be interpreted as guidelines.
Conversely, the decision maker may elect to control prices direetli'.
In this case he would either override (7) and use p, as the control variable
or possibly choose to control both pr-, and p,.
C. Some A na/rile Results with Direct J'age Controls
The wage-price control problem outlined above with direct wagecon-
trols can be formulated in terms of a discrete time Pontryagin minimum
principle problem with i', as the control variable. Thenecessary and
sufficient conditions for an optimum are given by:
(14i)n = [p-I-U
I + U7 + 1437117
2: i'C: + u3imi7p4, -
011 *1 (l4ii)A(-, = u,(l - v)[p, - Pit]-+-(I - v)Fp,,-
(4*2 *' + u2,J)(--17i,) + u4(n$ pç, - ',EAt)
+ (I1] +u10)Aclr+i)+ ky4(,fl,
this
*1
de- (I 4iii)A4, = = U,PL pitPirj + i'[p, - iv,] + u3( PA:2,n7',)
and
tiofl + U4(pA, -fl7pcz)-4- L'AC(,I) -ki3A41,
ose OH
(I4iv)P1,ti) = (I 17f170)Pcz+ ip,t'p4, + iti',, the
Fhi s
only and
rces, OH (14v) p4 = kyp-, - kI3PA! + cii.
(1 +
OAC(i+ I)
Given the proper boundary conditions these five difference equations
can be solved for the optimal trajectories oF the control variable i', and
the corresponding trajectories OfCI.Ai, A, and A41.
It is also instructive however to examine separately the individual
equations. To facilitate this examination we set u2 == 0. Under these
circumstances the wage control rule (14i) reduces to
(15) p0 - IJAC1I+I1.
The critical variable inthis expressionisthe time varying shadow
price Ac(,i). Using (14i) through (l4iii),itis possible to show that this

















(16)A.,,1 - (1-°)1l --pJ -+v1,
i&ii7[p, FZ7C,i A
for the .r,peeial'a,S'ein which theeconomy has no flexpricesect)1 i.e.,for sshieh == = = 0, equation (16) further rc(Juccsto
(I?) = A0, -- U,(Pi,
It followsni mediately from (17) that A,< Awhenevorp, ,' I)uring a period of controls thiswould almost certainly bethe case This result together with (15) impliesthat u', approachesPh as ti',I e., th policy rule compensates theemployee for an increasingfraction 0!airs price increase Over tiflle.Alternatively the policy rulecan he written as
(18) i'i'= (;,,
where the variable policycoefficient (I, increasesover time andapproaches I towards the end of thehorizon, This isa "cry desirable property
because it slates that in the last fewperiods of the controlprogram the enipl'ee isl'ull' compensated forall price andproductivity increasesConse- quently, there should he minimumpressure for awage-price e.spls when the controlsare terminated3
I-or the moregeneral niodelwhich includes theflexprice sector, the optimal wage control ruleis governed by(I S) and (16). Asabove, a smooth transition fromwage controls hackto the marketrequires, minimally thatt'Tp1, i.e., that A015approaches zero asiapproaches 7'. This obviouslyimplies that < Ar,. As can he seen from(16) this inequalitholds when is quite small,p,, > p, the third andfourth terms of the r.h.s. of'(16) are also small,and A,> 0. Typically these conditions all hold. Howevera separate exaniinatioii ofeach condition is in for in at I ye.
The first conditionderives !'roni the factor17(1nj) which applies to the entire r,hs of(16) and is thereforepotcntijlly very disruptive.The parameter iis the adjustnienitor pass through coeflicientfor any increased cost of producingfixprice goods. A largen could prove damagingbecause it implies thata high flexprice inflationrate would more quicklbecome imbedded in theprice of lixpricecommodities However, italso implies that a wageincrease controlledat a low level is alsoquickly passed on. and this servesto improve theperformance of thecontrols The net im- pact of increasingj from .3 to .6 isstudied below,
The impact ofthis factor 17(1-) is also dependenton the param- eterwhich measuresthe input intensjt'of the flexpricegood. The value
































ofis approximately I. if this should increase sigmlicantly either because
of a higher relative cost for Ilexprice goods or because of a more flexprice
intensive technology, the eflicacv of wage-price controls would he under-
miii ed.
The second condition, that p,, > p. has been discussed previously.
It imposes no real restriction since temporary controls will only be Con-
sidered in periods characterized h' an inflation which exceeds the tar-
geted rate.
The smooth functioning of a wage control program also requires
that the third term on the r.h.s. of (16),v[ Pu -']be small. This ob-
viously derives from equity considerations, but exists independently only
for a non-zero flexprice market. The parametervmeasures the fraction of
national product comprised of Ilexprice outputs. A plausible estimate
here is .1Again any substantial increase in this fraction would impede
an orderly reduction in the level of the shadow priceA(r.and therefore
obstruct the operation of a wage-price control program
Similarly, efficient operation of the control program requires that
the fourthterniof ther.h.s.of16).114117 [pA, -- n7p,).besmall.
The bracketed tern) captures induced allocative inefficiency as measured
by the deviation between the controlled and market determined relative
price trajectories. From (16) it follows that an\ increase in the deviation
interferes with the smooth dampening of X(r. The extent of this inter-
ference also depends on the relative size of the allocation weight144.Too
great an emphasis on allocation could prove so disruptive as to lead to a
rejection of all controls, as is shown in the simulation studies reported in
the next section.
In summary it should he clear from all of the above that the intro-
duction of a flexprice sector into the model complicates any control pro-
gram. The control rule is then governed by equations (14)and (16) in-
stead ofby the more simple equations (15) and (17). Nonetheless, in both
cases the rule can be written in the general variable policy coefficient for-
mat of (l8). Furthermore for the plausible parameter estimates used in
this study. the controls for the more complex economy still appear to be
relatively smooth and efficient. This is demonstrated b' the simulation re-
sults presented in the next section.
4. SiuiiioSTuDIIs 01-Diirci WAGECoNTRo1s
To illustrate the basic arguments outlined above, eight simulation
studies of direct wage controls are reported in this section. The first four
focus on the allocation question and its implications for direct controls.
4Wc note that the impitcit seihr br this term in the criterion bunction is I..\nin-
crease in this relatise sseighi s oubd ohviousby also increase the negatise influenceof ihl\
term
SI IThe next three experiments analvie diflerent approachesto a'ojdjnga
'age-price CXpI()SiOfl once controls arc suspended. The final
simulatjoii
Lests the robustness of the earlier findings by van ing the costpass through
cueflicictit, which appears to he the most sensitive parameter in the
svsteni.
The model used in these siniiilations is the liexprice_fixprice
model
constructed in Section 2. The economic environment is thatappropriate
to the price movements presented in tableI B. This implies aninherited
inflation characterized by first period quarterly pricechanges of 3",,y
and I .65",, respectively in the flexprice, fixprice and laborsectors ad-
dition a 10",, shortfall in supply in the flexpricesector is posited forthe
first six quarters of the planning horizon.
A. ill isa/location and ('onlro/.v
In the first sini u lation St udv the criterionfunctionisdefined b
U= .5, u = == 0 and u100. This implies thatany indUced
misallocation is costless. The results of thisexperiment are recorded in
table 2A and figureI and are generally very satisfactory.By the end of the
2 quarter horizon the inflationrate in all three sectorsapproaches the
targeted level of I",, per quarter. The shadowprice A(414of equation (15)
diminishes over the horizon andapproaches zero, and thepolicy Co. efficient G, of equation (18)converges on one. These trajectoriesare con-
sistent with the findings of section 3 thata variable coefficient policyrule is optimal. At thesame time, they imply thatage earners and salaried
employees are almost fullycompensated for all price andproductivjt. changes in the last fewquarters of the control horizon. Thisnear com-
plete compensation reducesthe pressure to recapture lostwages once the controls arc suspended.5
This is an important findingand is one possibleexplanation for the failure of previous inconlespolicies. These policies haveall been of the fixed policy coeflIcientvariety. A lixed coefficientpolicy rule does not
compensate fulls for price andproductivits increaseseven in the final periods. Consequentlysubstantial latentpressure exists to right induced
distributional inequities. Thispressure is capable of triggeringa wage. price explosion, similarto that of 1973 74. whichcan negate most of the gains of the controls.
The seco,,d .VfIflUiCtfojjexperiment recognizes thecost of induced mis- allocation The criterionfunction is definedby u1 = .5,,, = 0, = .3 and Uç = 100. and thecontrol rule isgoverned by equation (16)
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































above. Beca use of the allocalive pressure.age controls are pursued
somewhat less vigorousIand the terminal characteristics ire marginall
less attractive. See table 2R. Nonetheless, the intlatioii is suppressed and
good coil Velgeiluc Is obtained iii the pulics cuellIcieiu
The third simulation experiment also focuses on the allocative !ssue.
While no increase in the aggregate penalty for misallocation is introduced,
the criterion function has been modified to redistribute the penalty so as
to penalize any deviant price relative. The loss function is defined by u= 5.
= u= u=.1 and u = 100. The simulation results are presented
in table 2C and figure1. In this instance imposed wage constraints are
markedly less severe at the beginning of the control horizon: still alt price
targets are approximately met by the twelfth period. The sliados price
decreases monotonically, while the policy coellicient (1, declines
from .756 to .708 in the sixth period before beginning its 5105% rise to one.
This unevenness in the policy coellicient trajectory lessens the intuitive ap-
peal ol the control rule and therefore reduces its chance of adoption.
However, the overall results of the policy appear reasonably satisfactory
and closel' parallel those of the first two simulations.
In the fourth .cwzulaiwn experiment, the weights on the allocatvc
terms are tripled. The results are recorded in table 2D. The controls again
meet the targeted inflation rates bthe tss ehith quarter. 1-lossever. the
shadow price and policy coefficient move so very slowly towards their
respective targets that a successful reentry into the free market appears to
be marginal, at best. A longer control period may he indicated: or pos-
sllth' under these circumstances the inflation should be moderated with
more conventional demand management policies, or with more selective
measures.
B. Variations on a Theme
It should he clear from equation (17) that the variable coellicient
policy rule is consistent with a time invariant u,. However, any increase
over time in u1 amplifies the variability, and a large Uc, the weight of the
price expectation term in the criterion function, leads to such an increase.
In all of the above simulations studies. us is set equal to tOO. In the li/i/i
simulation, u is reduced to 10, and the other weights are given by u =
.5 and u2 == u = 0. The results of this experiment arepresented in
table 3A. These should be compared with those ol' the lIrst simulation run
recorded in table 2A. From this comparison itis evident that while the
indicated controls of this fifth simulation are some\s hat less vigorous and
the targets slightly underachieved, all trajectories are quite similar to those
which obtained using u= 100. It follows that while the control results
are indeed sensitive to the relative emphasis placed onthe terminal ex-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7The two sets of simulation results given in tables 3D and 3C assume
the use of the alternative criterion function described in footnote 2. Inthis
criterion lunction, the fifth or terminal expectation term isreplaced by a
iIc% term dcsigiicd to align adjusted money wageincreases in each period
with the targeted inflation rate. This is a rather conventional approach to
the design of incomes policy measures, and corresponds loosely tothe
structure of the Nixon controls of 197! 73. Inthe first of these simula-
tioris the criterion function is defIned by a = .5, ii, == U4 = 0, u =
.5 and u = .5. In the second simulation allocativecriteria are considered
and the function is defined by u1 = .5.a= = .1 ,= .5 and
a6 .5. The coefficient 116 isassociated with the equity term which inall
previous simulations had an implicit weight of one. The sumof the co-
ellIcient of the two equity ternis in the alternative function, u-and a6, also
equals one. The results in tables 3B and 3C should be comparedwith
those given in tables 2A and 2C respectively. As is evidentfrom this
comparison, the alternative specification is less attractive onall counts:
inflation control, equity, and terminal or reentry considerations.
In the final sunulaiwn. the cost pass through coefficient ij of equation
(7) is doubled. This allows an analsis of the sensitivityof the control
measures to variations in this parameter. Fromequation (16) it appears
that an increase ini should reduce the elThctivcnessof the controls be-
cause this increase implies thatprices in the fIxprice sector adapt more
quickly to the 'destabilizing' impact of volatile auction sector prices.This
is true. However, this adverse impact is more thanofFset by the more rapid
adaption of price in the fixprice sector to co,itrolled wage increases.Con-
sequently as shown in table 3D and figure 2. the simulatedinflation re-
sponds very quickly and equitably to wage controls. Thecriterion func-
tion used in this simulation is given by= .5, 142 = u = u4 = .1and u =
100. and corresponds to that of simulation 3 above.Table 3D should
therefore be compared with 2C. The control results ofthis last simulation
are significantly better on every count.This is particularly impressive
since the model with= .6 generates asomewhat higher rate of inflation
on the free market. ComparetablesI B andI D. This sensitivity testis
obviously illustrative. Nevertheless, since it focuses onwhat was believed
a priori to be the most sensitive parameterin the system. this experiment
suggests that the control conclusions derivedabove may be rather robust.
5. Cosci.csioN
An alternative to direct wage controls is direct pricecontrols. No
analytic or simulation results for direct price controls arepresented in
this paper. However, the results obtaining from direct pricecontrols in
the tixprice market are analogous to those of direct wagecontrols, with
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live in dealing with excess demand inflation. Because of this, auction
markets have historically been exempted from controls.
[he study is obviously incomplete as several major questions reiflalil
iinaiiswere.d. These include:I low much relative price movement can he
tolerated before wage controls must yield to direct intervention in see-
toral markets'? At what point do allocation considerations require the
substitution of direct controls by restraining monetary and fiscal mea-
sures? How serious are the consequences of introducing a heterogeneous
labor force? What is the implication of introducing a quasi rational ex-
pectation hypothesis? These are all subjects for a continuing study.
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